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Long-Term Disagreement 
Philosophical Models in Scriptural Reasoning and Receptive Ecumenism 
 
Nicholas Adams, University of Edinburgh 
 
This article will explore points of contact between two practices of encounter between 
different traditions: scriptural reasoning (SR) and receptive ecumenism (RE).  It will 
focus on shared philosophical shapes.  This is not an area that has been explored 
much, and the findings of this inquiry should be treated as provisional.  SR and RE 
will be characterised as strategies for dealing with long-term disagreement, that is as 
strategies that do not seek to preserve or promote such disagreement, but which face it 
in a non-utopian manner and seek to maintain a concern with truth while taking 
questions of tradition seriously.  The significance of SR and RE lies in their mediation 
of a sophisticated anti-foundationalism and a rejection of secular universalism in 
practices whose participants are not experts in philosophy.  This is significant, I shall 
argue, because the philosophical habits of participants in inter-faith engagement and 
ecumenical dialogue often display signs of foundationalism and secular universalism: 
SR and RE explicitly aim to change these habits.  Their significance lies not in any 
new insights into philosophical method so much as in their capacity to embed certain 
philosophical developments, especially within pragmatism, in institutions, in such a 
way as to shape everyday practices. 
 
There is a body of literature, from a variety of practitioners, about both SR and RE.
1
  I 
shall comment on two short pieces, one by Peter Ochs, ‘Rules for Scriptural 
Reasoning’ and one by Paul Murray, ‘Receptive Ecumenism and Catholic Learning: 
Establishing the Agenda’.2  Each is an introduction to their respective practices, 
naming the philosophical approaches that characterise them.  These are named 
‘pragmatism’, which for Ochs derives from the study of CS Peirce and for Murray 
                                                 
1
 On Scriptural Reasoning see various issues of the Journal of Scriptural Reasoning 
(http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/ssr last accessed 31 Dec 2012) from 2001 to the present; see also 
David Ford and Chad Pecknold (eds.) The Promise of Scriptural Reasoning (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 
which contains 12 essays.  On Receptive Ecumenism see Paul Murray (ed.) Receptive Ecumenism and 
the Call to Catholic Learning (Oxford: OUP, 2008), which contains 32 essays.  See also the website for 
the project, https://www.dur.ac.uk/theology.religion/ccs/projects/receptiveecumenism/, whose 
documents extend up to the end of 2011.  Last accessed 31 Dec 2012: at that date, the site had a 
number of broken links. 
2
 Peter Ochs ‘The Rules of Scriptural Reasoning’ Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, May 2002, 
http://tinyurl.com/ochs-rules-2002. Last accessed 9 Dec 2012], my emphasis.  Paul Murray ‘Receptive 
Ecumenism and Catholic Learning: Establishing the Agenda’ in Murray (ed.) Receptive Ecumenism, 
pp.5-25 
from the study of Nicholas Rescher.
3
  This essay focuses on the significance of the 
philosophical methods they advocate in relation to SR and RE. 
 
Both SR and RE are explicitly reparative practices.
4
  They identify particular 
problems in existing practices, resolving them through diagnosis and presenting 
alternatives.  RE is concerned with existing practices of ecumenism that display 
failure of various kinds.  SR is concerned with existing practices of the study of 
religious life (and the errant philosophical methods they rely on).  Where RE is 
described by Murray explicitly as an alternative to existing failed ecumenical 
strategies, Ochs is less interested in inter-faith encounter, and more concerned with 
problems in the academy.  RE is oriented to the Church,  SR to the University. (I shall 
ignore more recent developments in SR, in which its practices are extended outside 
the university.  These merit further investigation requiring detailed fieldwork.) 
 
There are significant differences between SR and RE: for reasons of space I consider 
only their shared philosophical orientation.  Ochs and Murray suggest that everyday 
problems in universities and churches are expressed in and exacerbated by errant 
philosophical methods.  These are not a matter for philosophers alone: they concern 
all those who study religious traditions and all those who engage in ecumenical 
dialogue. In the accounts by Ochs and Murray philosophical problems are treated 
alongside more local problems in the study of religious traditions and the practices of 
ecumenism. 
 
Scholars of religious traditions and participants in ecumenical dialogue rely (whether 
implicitly or explicitly) on particular philosophical methods.  Where these methods 
are problematic, Ochs and Murray recommend alternatives.  The two most prominent 
errant philosophical methods identified in the study of religious traditions and in 
ecumenical dialogue are rationalist in character.  Ochs and Murray do not mean that 
scholars of religious traditions or participants in ecumenical dialogue are advocates of 
such methods.  Rather, certain philosophical habits can be discerned in their practices 
and their specific problematic features can be identified.  These problematic features 
can arguably be traced back to Descartes and Kant, but it is the problematic features 
that are of concern rather than their intellectual heritage.  These problematic features 
                                                 
3
 See Peter Ochs Peirce, Pragmatism and the Logic of Scripture (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); Paul Murray 
Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatist Perspective (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), esp. pp.91-162.  
Murray’s introductory chapter to the Receptive Ecumenism volume rehearses, in an abbreviated form, 
many of the arguments in the opening chapter of his book on pragmatism, which is also entitled 
‘Establishing the Agenda’. 
4
 For a brief overview of this approach to philosophy see Nicholas Adams ‘Reparative Reasoning’ 
Modern Theology July 2008, pp.447-457  
are named by Murray ‘foundationalism’ and ‘the pursuit of neutral ground’ and by 
Ochs ‘Cartesianism’ and ‘Secular Universalism’. 
  
Foundationalism 
 
Foundationalism has three key features: its orientation to previous philosophical 
methods, its way of handling doubt and certainty, and its approach to starting points.  
These can be elaborated briefly in turn. 
 
Foundationalism rejects the methods of its predecessors.  Cartesian philosophy grew 
out of a dissatisfaction with Aristotelian Scholastic practices.
5
  Instead of diagnosing 
problems in those practices and repairing them piece by piece, the entire nexus of 
practices was taken to be in error and a new method was developed to replace it in 
toto.  The root problem was dependence on venerable authorities.  In the various 
scholastic practices of both Catholic and Protestant thinkers appeals were made to 
authorities in support of arguments.  Such authorities included pagan sources 
(especially Aristotle), Biblical sources (especially Psalms or the letters of St Paul), 
and ecclesiastical sources including Church Fathers (especially Augustine).  Many 
debates between Catholic and Protestant leaders were resolvable, at least in principle, 
so long as there was agreement on what counted as an authority.  Aquinas had already 
shown in his Summa Theologiae that the principal authorities did not agree on certain 
doctrinal points, and it was central to his presentation of arguments that these 
opposing views were identified at the start, in the form of ‘objectiones’ and ‘sed 
contra’ summaries.  It was then the task of the theologian, in a ‘respondeo’ section, to 
work through these oppositions and offer a reasoned provisional judgement that 
resolved them.  By the time of the seventeenth century, however, there was 
disagreement not only about such provisional judgements but disagreement on what 
counted as an authority.  The Protestant principle of sola scriptura tended to 
undermine appeals to pagan authorities, to the doctors of the Church, to conciliar 
settlements or (most emphatically) to papal judgements ex cathedra.  The scholastic 
methods of argumentation were unable to resolve these disagreements about 
authorities, because they relied on prior agreement at this level, and arguments thus 
began to display a tendency towards interminable debate.  Cartesian philosophy thus 
commended a method that refused appeals to any authority.  Rather than develop a 
philosophical method that took into account different authorities, Cartesian 
philosophy rejected methods which appealed to authority and instead promoted a 
                                                 
5
 See Jorge Secada Cartesian Metaphysics: The Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2000); Roger Ariew Descartes and the Last Scholastics (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999).  The sketch 
that follows is my own. 
method which appealed to demonstrable truths.  This method was intended wholly to 
replace its predecessors. 
 
Foundationalism pits unlimited doubt against absolute certainty.  Cartesian method 
rejects the provisional judgements of the theological ‘I reply that’: their starting points 
can be doubted.  In their place, the method takes absolute certainty as the only rational 
starting point, in the expectation that a secure starting point will deliver more secure 
arguments.  The uncertain conflict of competing authorities is replaced by the clarity 
of mathematical deduction.  Only that which cannot be doubted counts as a starting 
point, and only that which can be deduced counts as a valid argument.  The 
uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of authorities are removed.  Doubt and 
certainty are no longer matters of ‘more or less’; they become matters of ‘yes or no’.  
Beliefs are no longer more or less doubtful or more or less certain.  They are either 
doubtful (because they cannot be demonstrated) or certain (because they can). 
 
Foundationalism starts with doubt and ends in certainty.  It is a distinctive mark of 
Cartesian thought that the initial orientation of the thinker is one of doubt.  This doubt 
is pervasive and unrestricted: any proposition offered at the outset is automatically 
placed in doubt, regardless of its content.  Only those propositions that survive such a 
test are admitted.  They are not merely accepted provisionally, as axioms, but 
absolutely, as certainties.  For Descartes himself such certainties are clear and distinct 
ideas, given by God, but for any foundationalism there must be some certainties of 
this kind.  Once they are secured, a process of deduction can get underway: its 
purpose is to build on these certainties in a quest for further certainties. 
 
The pragmatism commended by Ochs and Murray is intended to repair the 
deficiencies that characterise foundationalism along three corresponding axes.  It 
seeks to recover a concern with authorities, especially those that are scriptural (Ochs) 
or doctrinal (Murray).  It attempts to soften doubts and certainties.  It reverses the 
priority of doubt and certainty.   
 
The first repair begins with an acknowledgement that different traditions privilege 
different authorities.  The pragmatic repair readily acknowledges that there is a 
problem to be addressed but sees the rejection of philosophies that admit authorities 
into trains of argument as an over-correction.  It is genuinely a problem if a member 
of one tradition attempts to argue against a member of another tradition through 
appeal to authorities if each participant privileges different authorities. This is, 
however, the normal state of affairs in inter-faith encounter and in ecumenical 
dialogue.  The pragmatic repair acknowledges that to understand another person’s 
argument is to understand which authorities they privilege.  The problem with the 
foundationalist method is its exclusion of authorities and thus of traditions themselves 
(because a tradition is the transmission of authorities).  Foundationalism correctly 
diagnoses the problem: there are different authorities in play.  But its repair is 
ruinously excessive: it refuses to admit authorities into argumentation.  The pragmatic 
repair accepts the diagnosis, but commends investigation into authorities rather than 
the pursuit of demonstrable truths.  Foundationalism fails partly because its 
demonstrable truths tend to be trivial.  The interesting doctrinal questions are 
excluded from philosophy because few demonstrable truths can be found in theology 
from which to begin; but the whole point of the exercise was to debate doctrinal 
questions. 
The second repair softens doubts and certainties.  Instead of unlimited doubts and 
absolute certainties, the pragmatic repair deals in occasional doubts and provisional 
certainties.  To those afflicted by a residual Cartesianism to speak of something as 
certain is to strip it of its provisionality.  To be certain is not to be provisional.  The 
pragmatic repair denies this.  To be certain is merely to be undoubted.  It might be 
placed in doubt at some point in the future, and it might survive or be defeated by 
such doubt.  Something is certain because, for the time being, it is not doubted.  Its 
certainty is provisional.  Such provisionality may be long-term; if that is so, it is 
because it tends, as a matter of fact, not to be doubted.  This is not because it is 
indubitable; it is because there is no good reason to doubt it.  The pragmatic repair 
refuses unlimited doubt.  Doubts need reasons.  In the absence of reasons, there is an 
absence of doubt.  A philosopher who says, ‘well I just doubt it’ is not a serious 
thinker for a pragmatist.  A philosopher is entitled to doubt if a reason for doubting 
can be given.  A thinker who says, ‘well it can be doubted’ utters a triviality for a 
pragmatist.  Anything can be doubted; the question is whether anything stimulates 
such doubt.  A foundationalist is committed to a method of saying ‘well it can be 
doubted’ until something is found that cannot be doubted.  Few of the things it finds 
are of much interest, theologically, because the important doctrinal questions tend to 
be provisional (if long-term) certainties.  The pragmatist is thus ‘certain’ of a great 
deal more than the foundationalist, but is more provisional about this certainty.  The 
pragmatist also doubts a great deal less than the foundationalist, because she requires 
reasons for doubting.  The pragmatist may also be indifferent to a range of claims: 
they are neither provisionally certain nor rationally doubted.  One might say that they 
are trivially hypothetical. 
 
The third repair reverses the priority of doubt and certainty.  The foundationalist 
begins with doubt and labours until certainty is found.  Once this basis is secured, a 
deductive method builds further certainties.  The pragmatist begins with a web of 
provisional certainties bearing complex relations to each other.  From time to time one 
or more of these certainties is placed in doubt, because a reason to doubt them arises, 
and this stimulates various investigations.  An axiom (a certainty) becomes an 
hypothesis (it is doubted) which is then tested (by investigations).  The hypothesis 
either survives such testing, in which case it becomes an axiom once again, or it fails 
to survive it, in which case its denial becomes certain (provisionally).  The key 
question for the pragmatist is when to convert an axiom into an hypothesis.  The 
thinker who says ‘any axiom can be converted into an hypothesis’ utters a triviality 
for the pragmatist.  The pragmatist begins with axioms, with a complex of provisional 
certainties, and introduces doubts only when good reasons stimulate a shift of 
orientation.  Whereas for the foundationalist everything starts out as an hypothesis 
requiring investigation, for the pragmatist everything starts out either as an axiom or 
as trivially hypothetical: neither requires investigation until a reason presents itself. 
  
Ochs and Murray make explicit the ways in which the pragmatist repairs of 
foundationalism inform inter-faith and ecumenical encounter.  Foundationalism is 
likely to be corrosive not only of the claims of other traditions, but of one’s own 
tradition.  The need for the pragmatic repair persists so long as foundationalist habits 
are widespread.  These are audible whenever one hears, ‘well I doubt that’ without 
good reason, or ‘that can be doubted’ or other variants.  But it is also audible 
whenever one hears ‘I will only be satisfied by absolute certainty’ or ‘unless you can 
demonstrate it, I will not believe it’.  These are widespread intellectual tendencies, 
and they are particularly ruinous when members of different traditions encounter each 
other.  If both sides agree that only absolute certainty is satisfactory, then they will be 
doomed to fix their gaze on trivial certainties, and to relegate the things that matter 
most to them to the realm of irrational ‘blind’ belief. 
 
Secular Universalism 
 
Like foundationalism, secular universalism (or the pursuit of neutral ground) is a 
pervasive intellectual habit which calls for repair.
6
  Like foundationalism it rejects 
tradition.  Where foundationalism seeks absolute certainty in the place of the 
provisional certainties of tradition, the pursuit of neutral ground explicitly refuses 
appeals to authorities and instead recommends ‘neutral’ appeals to reason.  The main 
                                                 
6
 Ochs ‘Rules’, §4; Murray ‘Establishing the Agenda’, p.7 
assumption that underlies the pursuit of neutral ground is that the criteria for 
judgement are innate and invariant.  This is a development of the Cartesian notion of 
the ‘natural light’ which itself is a very late development of the Augustinian topos of 
divine illumination which accompanies his epistemology.
7
  Its implications for 
philosophical method, especially in relation to questions of disagreement between 
members of different traditions, are serious.  Because criteria for judgement are 
considered innate, they are taken to be necessary.  An opponent in debate thus does 
not merely deny something that I affirm; my opponent denies reason itself. 
 
To argue in a way that is contrary to reason is not just to be mistaken.  It is to be 
grievously in the wrong.  One’s utterances do not merely require correction: they call 
for a particularly strong repudiation.  Someone who teaches things that are contrary to 
reason does not merely provoke disagreement.  They have no business teaching at all, 
and do not belong in a university devoted to the pursuit of reason. 
 
In the realm of inter-faith engagement and ecumenical dialogue, such secular 
universalism, such pursuit of neutral ground - of criteria that are true a priori - is 
particularly toxic.  It displays a tendency to treat opponents as irrational.  Your 
arguments, in such a framework, are not just products of a different tradition: they are 
expressions of a refusal to think.  I am liable not just to reject your arguments, but you 
yourself as a serious partner in discussion.  Instead of disagreeing, we become 
engaged in mutual dismissal. 
 
The pragmatic repair of the pursuit of neutral ground is to refuse to attribute criteria 
for judgement to neutral reason, but to identify them as reasons located in traditions of 
thought.  Some criteria - trivial ones, from a theological perspective - are so 
widespread as not to need any such explicit attribution.  There is no ‘Muslim’ periodic 
table of the elements and no ‘Lutheran’ trigonometry.  By contrast, it is obvious that 
different traditions interpret texts in a distinctive way.  Interpretations of the Talmud, 
of the New Testament and of medieval Islamic legal texts are not covered by a single 
discipline of ‘hermeneutics’ which specifies a single set of interpretive rules applied 
to a range of different materials.  Different traditions treat different texts differently.  
The nineteenth century fantasy of a unified hermeneutic theory, which typically 
attempted to harmonise methods for interpreting Classical and Biblical texts, 
produced some fascinating insights and clarified a number of previously obscure 
                                                 
7
 John Rist ‘Faith and Reason’ in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann The Cambridge Companion 
to Augustine (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), pp.26-39.  This is a classic example of a concept whose 
meaning changes radically as it is transmitted.  See Lydia Schumacher Divine Illumination The History 
and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
questions.  But it attempted to regulate the interpretation of texts - to specify the rules 
an interpreter must follow - rather than to describe, in a more ethnographically 
attentive way, how texts are actually interpreted.  It was strong on theory but weak on 
case studies.
8
  It described reasonably well the practices of university scholarship but 
failed to do justice to the practices of ecclesial reading (and ignored the Jewish sages 
and Muslim jurists).  The pragmatic repair of secular universalism, of the pursuit of 
neutral ground, is also a repair of the over-generalisations found in nineteenth century 
hermeneutics.  This does not take the form of a more adequate universal 
hermeneutics.  It notices that there are, and attends to, different traditions of 
interpretation.  Participants in SR and RE are stimulated to make small-scale 
investigations into another’s practices of reading.9  This does not yield a hermeneutic 
theory; it produces something analogous to ethnography: a description of something 
observed combined with an attempt to understand it. 
 
The refusal of foundationalist method and of the pursuit of neutral ground in 
philosophy is a familiar topos in the discipline of philosophy in the university: such 
refusals are commonplace in German Idealism, in French Phenomenology, in English 
Analytic Philosophy or in American Pragmatism.  Their significance for SR and RE is 
that such refusals are not only for disciplinary specialists.  Their significance is their 
gradual institutionalisation into the practices of theologians whose training is in 
doctrine, biblical interpretation, Talmud, Da’wah, and other non-philosophical 
disciplines.  SR and RE embed the fruits of specialised philosophical investigation - in 
this case those of pragmatist philosophy - in everyday practices of inter-faith and 
ecumenical engagement.  One of the most regrettable failures of modern philosophy 
in the twentieth century is the limited scope of its application outside a small guild of 
philosophers.  SR and RE show a capacity to mediate the later repair of these 
traditions, whether in idealist, analytic or pragmatist variants, in popular practices. 
 
Having cast the discussion as one of repair - in this case the repair of rationalist 
method in philosophy - we can now turn to the fruits of this repair and attempt to 
discern the shapes of thinking displayed in SR and RE.  Our concern here is with the 
shapes of thinking rather than their genesis and transmission. 
 
The shapes of thinking in SR and RE display two notable features:  a willingness to 
consider triadic as well as binary forms, and a privileging of positive over negative 
truth claims. 
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 See Nicholas Adams ‘The Bible’ in Adams, Pattison and Ward (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Theology and Modern European Thought (Oxford: OUP, 2013), pp. 545-566 
9
 Ochs ‘Rules’, §6E 
 Triadic Forms 
 
Everyday forms of judgement tend, quite properly, to be binary.  Words have 
meanings, claims are right or wrong, beliefs are axiomatic or hypothetical.  A binary 
form assigns a value to a variable.  As Descartes and Spinoza grasped so well, the 
most easily demonstrated examples are mathematical.  A triangle is a polygon with 
three corners or vertices and three sides or edges which are line segments; the area of 
a circle is expressed as π multiplied by the square of the radius; we can treat as 
axiomatic the belief that a submerged object will displace its own volume whereas a 
floating object will displace its own mass, and so forth.  In the realm of mathematics 
judgements quite properly take a binary form.  The same is true in the realm of 
theology, for the most part.  The world is God’s good creation; Jesus is fully human 
and fully divine; we can treat as axiomatic the belief that God is Trinity, and so forth.  
Systematic theology within any one tradition is rightly taught as a nexus of axiomatic 
claims which then permit the investigation of various hypotheses such as ‘God shares 
in human suffering’ or ‘Capitalism is incompatible with the doctrine of creation’. 
 
As is well known, however, things are more complex in classic doctrinal arguments.  
’The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son’.  ‘Salvation comes by faith alone’.  
A Catholic theologian affirms the filioque, whereas an Orthodox theologian affirms its 
absence.  A Lutheran affirms the formula sola fides, whereas an Anglican may or may 
not affirm it.  What is positively axiomatic for a Catholic theologian is negatively 
axiomatic for an Orthodox theologian.  What is axiomatic for a Lutheran is 
hypothetical for an Anglican.  In a binary form of judgement, questions of truth are 
decided in a yes/no fashion.  For a Catholic theologian, the Orthodox omission of the 
filioque is errant; for a Lutheran theologian the Anglican equivocation over sola fides 
is errant.  I am right and you are wrong.  This is a familiar shape of thinking with a 
bloody history.  The nineteenth century liberal Protestant approach to such questions 
was to recast ‘objective’ dogmatic claims about God’s being as ‘subjective’ claims 
about human experience of the divine.  This too is a binary shape of thinking: 
objective dogmatic claims are errant. 
 
In ecumenical and inter-faith encounter, binary shapes of thinking are problematic.  
What I affirm, you deny.  What is axiomatic for you is hypothetical for me.  There are 
a number of strategies for addressing this problem, and these can be cast as ideal 
types.  One is a conservative strategy of agreement.  ‘We should focus on our shared 
affirmations and denials and should seek to minimise contrary cases.’  This strategy 
tends to produce documents with forms of words which both sides can affirm.  
Another is a liberal strategy of agreement.  ‘We should assume that we approach a 
single truth in different ways: we are “essentially” the same and only “inessentially” 
different.’  This strategy, which over-generously permits the speaker to assume 
authority for identifying what is, and what is not, essential, tends to produce 
generalised truth claims and to avoid dogmatic forms that are particular to traditions.  
Both strategies preserve the binary shape of judgement.  Where I affirm X and you 
affirm Y, an agreement can be forged where we affirm Z. 
 
SR and RE offer alternatives to strategies of agreement.  They furnish strategies for 
long-term disagreement.  Instead of identifying the problem as one of substance, 
namely my affirmation of X versus your affirmation of Y, it identifies the problem as 
one of form.  It is the binary shape that provokes conflict: I am right and you are 
wrong.  In a binary shape, it is a problem that what I affirm you deny and that what is 
axiomatic for you is hypothetical for me.  In a triadic shape, it is not a problem: it is 
merely a fact.  Instead of confronting a triadic problem with a binary solution, it 
confronts a binary problem with a triadic solution.  Instead of replacing the ‘for me’ 
and the ‘for you’ with a ‘for us’, it preserves the ‘for me’ and the ‘for you’ structure.  
A binary form assigns a value to a variable.  A triadic form describes how, or rather 
names for whom, a value is assigned to a variable. 
 
This produces some significant changes to the form judgements take.   
 
Consider the binary form: ‘X is true; Not-X is false.’ 
 
A triadic form is quite different: ‘I affirm X; you deny X.’ 
 
Consider another binary form: ‘X is axiomatic; Y is hypothetical.’ 
 
The triadic form includes qualifications: 
 
‘X is axiomatic for me but hypothetical for you. 
Y is hypothetical for me but axiomatic for you.’ 
 
Truth claims do not disappear in triadic forms.  They are preserved but qualified:  
 
‘I affirm "X is true"; you deny "X is true".’ 
 
It is worth considering the problematic claim: ‘X is true for me but false for you’. 
 
This last claim is confused.  A binary claim assigns a value to a variable.  A triadic 
claim describes for whom a value is assigned to a variable.  The problematic claim 
assigns a value (indeed two contrary values) to a variable; it does not properly 
describe for whom (or how) a value is assigned to a variable.  That is not the main 
problem, however.  The deeper problem is that it misuses the word ‘true’.  X is either 
true or not true.  A triadic form does not modify the assigning of a value to a variable.  
Triadic forms do not adjudicate truth claims at all.  A triadic form preserves that act of 
assigning without modification.  It adds a description: it specifies who assigns the 
value to the variable. 
 
SR and RE are specialised forms of discourse which deal in a disciplined way in 
triadic forms.  They avoid claims about what is ‘essential’ and ‘inessential’.  They 
also avoid, in an interesting way, ‘we’ or ‘for us’ claims.  SR and RE tend not to seek 
common ground in the face of difference.  Instead they tend to produce forms of 
thought which describe difference in ways that preserve long-term disagreements. 
 
This might appear a rather meagre benefit.  After all, it is no great shock to those 
engaged in ecumenical dialogue to discover that Catholics affirm, but Orthodox deny, 
the filioque.  Likewise it is no great surprise to those engaged in inter-faith encounter 
to learn that Muslims deny, but Christians affirm, the divinity of Jesus. 
 
There are two benefits.  The first is that SR and RE tend not to pursue strategies for 
agreement, whether of the ‘conservative’ kind (through documents with approved 
forms of words) or the ‘liberal’ (which aggressively identify a common ‘essential’ 
core and treat differences as ‘inessential’).  Instead they pursue strategies for long-
term disagreement, in which binary claims are preserved in triadic forms.  The second 
is that the triadic forms tend to stimulate new investigations.  The claim ‘I am right 
and you are wrong’ stimulates a rather limited investigation.  I seek to demonstrate 
my rightness and your wrongness.  The criteria for judging my rightness and your 
wrongness will most likely be uniform.  If I adopt a triadic form, ‘I affirm, you deny’ 
then this permits more sophisticated approaches.  The binary form ‘X is true or false’ 
requires X to be univocal.  The claim ‘I affirm X; you deny X’ normally indicates that 
X is univocal, but this is not necessarily so.  I might mean something different by X 
from you.  The case of the filioque is instructive.  This appears to be a case in which 
Catholics affirm, but Orthodox deny, X.  But as every student of theology knows, it is 
not straightforwardly true that what Catholics affirm, the Orthodox deny.  Catholics 
affirm something about God’s love in affirming ‘and the Son’.  The Spirit here is an 
expression of a relation of love.  The Orthodox affirm something about the Father’s 
authority when they affirm ‘from the Father’.  They do not take themselves to be 
denying something about God’s love when omitting ‘and the Son’.  Catholics and 
Orthodox are affirming different things when they include or omit the filioque.  This 
is a commonplace in the study of theology.  To say ‘X is true or false’ in this case is 
highly misleading.  To say ‘C affirm X; O deny X’ is misleading if X is taken 
univocally.  But the triadic form permits equivocation in a way the binary form does 
not.  A failure to equivocate over the filioque is arguably a failure to understand 
Catholic and Orthodox doctrine.  Triadic forms stimulate investigation into 
equivocation.  
 
A Christian-Muslim conversation can clarify some further benefits of this way of 
proceeding.  Take the claims ‘Jesus is divine and human’ and ‘Muhammad is a 
prophet’.  These are binary claims as they stand: they assign a value to a variable.  
They can be easily rendered in triadic forms: 
 
Christians affirm ‘Jesus is divine and human’. 
Muslims deny ‘Jesus is divine and human’. 
 
This case is fairly straightforward. 
 
Muslims affirm ‘Muhammad is a prophet’. 
Christians do not affirm ‘Muhammad is a prophet’. 
 
This case is more complex, because ‘Muhammad is a prophet’ is not a claim on which 
Christian doctrine typically takes a view.  The two cases, about Jesus and about 
Muhammad, are thus not of the same kind.  A further triadic clarification is needed. 
 
It is axiomatic for Christians that Jesus is divine and human. 
It is axiomatic for Muslims that Jesus is not divine and human. 
 
It is axiomatic for Muslims that Muhammad is a prophet. 
It is hypothetical for Christians that Muhammad is a prophet. 
 
This triadic form does not stimulate investigation, for Muslims, into whether Jesus is 
divine: it shows that such investigation is not needed, because there is nothing 
introduced that might unsettle the axiom.  But it does stimulate investigation, for 
Christians, into whether Muhammad is a prophet.  Such investigation is, in this case, 
unlikely to lead to a consensus in Christian theology, although it might provoke some 
interesting sermons.  The prophethood of Muhammad is likely to remain a 
hypothetical matter.  That suggests that it is unlikely to become an axiom for 
Christians that Muhammad is not a prophet.  This has very significant benefits for 
inter-faith engagement.  It is not possible to achieve the same level of sophistication 
with binary claims.  Consider the following four: 
 
Muhammad is a prophet. 
Muhammad is not a prophet. 
Muhammad may be a prophet. 
Muhammad may not be a prophet. 
 
The second and fourth claims are not innocuous for Muslims.  Any Christian who 
utters them is assigning a value to a variable in a way that will make conversation 
prickly, to say the least.  Sometimes such prickliness is appropriate or at least 
unavoidable.  But in this case it is eminently avoidable.  To say, ‘it is hypothetical for 
Christians that Muhammad is a prophet’ is to suspend the assigning of a value to a 
variable.  It does not make any claim about Muhammad.  The binary forms cannot 
avoid making such a claim, however optative its mood.  The triadic form permits a 
theological investigation of a noticeably different kind. 
 
An issue of trust underlies this difference.  It will be difficult to sustain trust in 
conversation if it appears that a participant is not saying what he really believes.  
Many Muslims are taught, disastrously, that Christians deny that Muhammad is a 
prophet.  This teaching is vague: it is not clear whether it is an empirical claim (‘some 
Christians deny it’) or a grammatical claim (‘to be Christian is to deny it’).  It is a 
dangerous teaching because it can insinuate the grammatical claim (which is false) by 
proving the empirical claim (which is true).  If a Christian is asked a question in a 
binary form, ‘Is Muhammad a prophet’, any answer in a corresponding binary form is 
likely to be problematic.  A Christian who affirms it may appear a liar; one who 
denies it is no friend; one who says ‘He may be’ is making the best of a bad binary 
job (and probably sounds a bit shifty).  By contrast, a triadic form offers a rather 
different complexion: ‘For Christians, this is a question that merits investigation’.  
This is obviously not a lie; it is not unfriendly; and it is not shifty.  It keeps the 
conversation going, which is no small matter, and in such a way that the participants 
are likely to learn more about each other’s theologies.  Triadic forms may promote 
peace, at the same time as they not only permit but require members of traditions to 
remain true to their traditions. 
 
Positive and Negative Truth Claims 
 
SR and RE are practices which tend to privilege positive truth claims and to be 
suspicious about negative ones.  This might appear to be a sign of their lamentable 
wishy-washiness - an indication that they lack backbone in the face of difficult 
conversations.  Perhaps participants are just too polite to speak plainly, and for this 
reason such practices just delay the inevitable and are best avoided.  That is possible.  
But it may, more positively, be a consequence of attending to triadic forms.  When 
judgements are offered in a binary form, an affirmation entails the denial of its 
negation.  ’Jesus is divine and human’ entails denying ‘Jesus is not divine and 
human’.  This case is straightforward.  When judgements are offered in a triadic form, 
however, entailment works differently.  ’Muslims affirm the prophethood of 
Muhammad’ does not entail ‘Christians deny the prophethood of Muhammad’.  There 
is no entailment at all: triadic forms stimulate investigation rather than offering a 
priori judgements.  ’Jews privilege law’ does not entail ‘Jews refuse grace’.  There is 
no entailment; there is only a possible investigation into Jewish understandings of law 
and grace. 
 
This latter case is worth considering further.  The Council of Trent articulates its 
canons on justification in a properly binary fashion.   
 
Canon I. If any one says that man may be justified before God by his own 
works, whether done through the teaching of human nature, or that of the 
law, without the grace of God through Jesus Christ; let him be anathema. 
 
This is properly binary because its function is to regulate theological claims; it quite 
properly assigns a value.  Its explicit task is to clarify Catholic doctrine in the face of 
Protestant challenges.  The first canon is interesting, in this regard, because it would 
be hard to find a Catholic or a Protestant who might contradict it.  The important point 
is that claims made in such a binary fashion, such as this canon, make no claims about 
what people believe.  This Catholic canon makes no claims about Protestants or 
indeed about Jews.  Those who drafted it certainly intended that Jews be anathema.  
They were doubtless certain that Jews refused the grace of God through Jesus Christ.  
Yet the canon itself makes no such claim: it is not a statement about what Jews do or 
do not believe.  The canon can be cast in a triadic form: For Catholics it is axiomatic 
that if any one...  No further claims are entailed by it. 
 
The problematic claim ‘Jews say a man may be justified...without the grace of God 
through Jesus Christ’ has a triadic form: it specifies for whom a statement holds true.  
This claim, however, is not entailed by the canon expressed in binary form.  To cast 
that canon in triadic form can only yield a claim about what Catholics believe, 
because it is a Catholic canon. The only canon that could be cast in a triadic form to 
express a claim about what Jews believe would be a Jewish canon.  A Catholic canon 
that said, God forbid, ‘Jews say a man may be justified...without the grace of God 
through Jesus Christ’ still has a binary form.  It can be cast triadically, but this will be 
informative in a rather different way: ‘For Catholics it is axiomatic that Jews say a 
man may be justified... without the grace of God through Jesus Christ.’  One is still 
unable to generate a triadic claim about Jewish belief: it can only produce a binary 
claim about Jews and a triadic claim about Catholics.  Other essays in this journal 
issue, especially those by David Ford and Paul Murray, have drawn attention to the 
ways in which documents from the Second Vatican Council contrast with, if not 
contradict, the claims of previous documents, including those of the Council of Trent.  
It would be a travesty to attempt to generate triadic claims about contemporary 
Catholicism on the basis of those older documents.  But my deeper point is that even 
those older documents offer resources for inter-faith and ecumenical encounter when 
one is equipped with intellectual tools relating to binary and triadic forms. 
 
It is in this sense that SR and RE are reserved about negative claims.  By negative I 
mean the identification of some shortcoming or deficiency.  Triadic forms are 
typically generated by taking binary forms and specifying for whom the claims hold 
true or false.  This requires a statement made by someone; the triadic form specifies 
that someone.  Triadic forms that are not produced in this way are suspect for SR and 
RE.  Catholic claims about Protestants have a binary form; Christian claims about 
Muslims have a binary form: they assign a value to a variable.  Catholic claims about 
what Protestants believe admittedly have a triadic form.  But it is crucial how this is 
generated.  If it is produced from a Protestant claim, it has the character of reported 
speech, and is likely to command Protestant assent: ‘Yes, we do believe that’.  But 
these are likely to be positive claims: ‘Only by faith.... only by scripture...’  It is easy 
enough to produce negative claims, of the kind ‘Protestants have an inadequate 
account of sacraments’.  But this has a binary form.  A triadic form is also relatively 
easy to produce: ‘It is axiomatic for Protestants that X’.  This will require some prior 
investigation, for sure.  But it is a positive claim, not a negative one.  Even the claim 
‘It is axiomatic for Protestants that not-X’ is a positive claim in this sense.  The 
attempt to produce, in a triadic form, a negative claim about another tradition, in the 
sense of specifying its deficiencies, is much more difficult.  It is difficult to identify 
deficiencies in Jewish thinking, by producing triadic claims about what Jews believe 
about grace, without a great deal of investigation into Jewish claims about grace.  This 
is rather rare. 
 
Typically, Christian statements about Jewish belief will turn out to be statements of 
Christian belief.  They are thus informative, but perhaps not in the way that those who 
make them intend.  They are properly triadic.  If they are produced by specifying the 
‘for whom’ of a binary statement made by Jews they will tend to be positive.  If they 
are produced by specifying the ‘for whom’ of a binary statement made by Christians, 
then their proper form will be ‘Christians believe that Jews believe that...’.  These 
may well be negative, in the sense specified above, but for practitioners of SR and 
RE, they will tend to be treated as guides to Christian rather than Jewish belief.  It is 
for these reasons that SR and RE tend to privilege positive claims about other 
traditions: negative claims are easily produced but they are uninformative, or at least 
they are not informative in the way that those who utter them intend. 
 
Three Grades of Long-Term Disagreement 
 
SR and RE share a pragmatic repair of certain tendencies in modern philosophy.  
These tendencies have long been diagnosed and addressed in philosophy itself from 
the late eighteenth century onwards, but at a more popular level they are persistent 
and in the cases of inter-faith and ecumenical encounter they are damaging.  This 
repair, in SR and RE, concerns the handling of doubt and certainty, a higher tolerance 
of provisionality, and a facility in handling triadic as well as binary forms.  I want to 
end by elaborating three grades of long-term disagreement, focusing on the positive 
possibilities that accompany the pragmatic repair, in ascending order of 
sophistication. 
 
The goals of SR and RE are not primarily those of agreement.  They are practices 
which make deep reasonings public, and which foster understanding and collegiality 
in the face of enduring differences.
10
  The possible forms of understanding and what 
                                                 
10
 See Nicholas Adams ‘Making Deep Reasonings Public’ Modern Theology, June 2006, pp.385-401; 
Nicholas Adams ‘Scriptural Reasoning and Interfaith Hermeneutics’ in David Cheetham, Ulrich 
Winkler and Oddbjørn Leirvik (eds) Interreligious Hermeneutics in Pluralistic Europe: Between Texts 
and People (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), pp.59-78 
Murray terms the ‘call’ of learning are multiple, however, and extend to qualities of 
engagement that have hitherto proven rather rare. 
 
The first grade of engagement might be named simply ‘claims’.  In practices of 
engagement, this level is reached when a member of one tradition can rehearse the 
claims made by a member of another tradition.  The Baptist minister who rehearses 
the contours of Catholic Eucharistic theology engages at this level.  The Muslim who 
rehearses what Christians mean by ‘I believe in one God’ does the same.  This is a 
significant raising of the level of discussion and mutual understanding between 
traditions; it has tended hitherto to be confined to those who have undergone formal 
study of a tradition other than one’s own.  One of the potential benefits of practices 
like SR and RE is that they enable participants to express this form of learning even 
when their expertise tends to lie (as it does for most theologians, most of the time) in 
their own traditions.  It is no great surprise when a Christian scholar of rabbinical 
texts displays an understanding of Jewish interpretation of Genesis 22.  When a 
Christian theologian shows such understanding, as a result of the experience of 
reading Genesis 22 with Jewish interpreters, something rather different has occurred.  
It is not just a display of learning; indeed it is a rather meagre and unreliable display 
because it is not rooted in thorough study of the relevant scholarship.  It is a decidedly 
limited display of learning; but it is also an act of collegiality which expresses a 
changed relation between members of traditions.  Part of the promise of SR and RE is 
their provision of occasions where members of one tradition learn to rehearse the 
claims of members of other traditions.  As I suggested above, these will often be 
claims expressed quite properly in binary forms, which can then generate triadic 
forms in which various small-scale investigations can be launched. 
 
The second grade of engagement might be named ‘conflicts’.  In practices like SR and 
RE, this level is reached when a member of one tradition can identify and rehearse 
disagreements within another tradition.  A Catholic theologian who can rehearse 
disagreements within Reformed theology over the doctrine of election engages at this 
level.    The Christian theologian who can rehearse rival accounts of Tawhid in 
medieval Islamic thought does the same.  This is obviously a deeper and more 
sophisticated form of engagement, and it is also rather riskier.  Forms of inter-faith 
and ecumenical engagement sometimes generate a temporary unity within 
denominations, for example, especially when there are more fundamental differences 
with other traditions in view.  For a member of such another tradition to disrupt this 
temporary unity, by reintroducing the conflicts that have been suspended, can prove 
surprising and unsettling.  It also deepens engagements in various ways.  To know 
another tradition’s conflicts is to be able to identify nuances that might permit more 
fruitful forms of collegiality.  Engagements between Christians and Muslims which 
focus on the oneness of God have a different character if the Muslim participants are 
familiar with internal Christian conflicts over the Trinity and if the Christian 
participants are able to rehearse different and perhaps rival strands in the medieval 
Islamic traditions.  Again this is a commonplace in scholarly discussions between 
experts.  The promise of SR and RE is to introduce conversation at this level of 
sophistication between those whose primary focus of scholarship is their own 
tradition. 
 
The third grade of engagement might be named ‘obscurities’.  Each tradition has its 
settled habits of speech and action, the beaten paths through familiar territory and the 
deep grammars on which one draws to negotiate the strange and the new.  But each 
tradition also has its blind spots: those areas of expression where language is stretched 
to breaking point, zones of experimentation, paradox and wilful self-contradiction.  
These are found in the mystical traditions, in negative theology, in the more 
speculative regions of philosophy, in the areas of theology that, in those traditions 
who practise or have practised censorship, are considered too dangerous for popular 
teaching.  Areas of obscurity show up where experience contradicts the deep 
grammars, and where mutating social forms stimulate descriptions that extend beyond 
the reach of settled categories.  In these cases certain voices of authority may insist all 
the more strongly on the familiar categories, and refuse to acknowledge any reality 
that cannot be cast in the old language; but in the long run this rarely proves 
satisfactory.  Languages change, in spite of those who refuse to let them.  The latter 
turn out not to be conservatives but dangerous innovators who speak undead words, 
uttering incantations strangely frozen in a state of arrested development.  At the same 
time human wickedness has shown itself agile and adaptable down the ages and it is 
often the deep grammars and the settled categories of religious traditions that act as a 
brake on their wild and destructive adventures.  It is a matter of obscurity whether a 
tradition is facing a new and strange expression of the good or yet another cunning 
face of human sin.  Theological debates over political forms, sexual practices, and 
medical interventions are often marked by conflicts between deep grammars and new 
words, and by categories being stretched and shrunk as they are pressed into 
unfamiliar use.  The third grade of engagement is reached when a member of one 
tradition is able to identify and rehearse the obscurities that mark another tradition.  
This is not a simple matter of rehearsing a tradition’s claims, nor even of tracing the 
course of its conflicts.  It is to give voice to its obscure utterances, to participate as a 
stranger in its attempts to say the unsayable.  This is an experience found most 
commonly in literary historians who learn to inhabit the poetry of the past.  It is as yet 
a largely untapped potential of SR and RE: mutual engagements between the mystical 
traditions are nonetheless on the horizon and it will be interesting to see how they 
develop. 
 
In conclusion, the philosophical shapes displayed in SR and RE have a reparative 
character, at least initially, as they work to re-tool a new generation of ecumenical and 
inter-faith practitioners.  Old habits of foundationalist method and a leaden pursuit of 
neutral ground pose deep problems for encounter between traditions, and SR and RE 
offer better pragmatic models to facilitate engagement.  Those philosophical shapes, 
which foster a facility in handling binary and triadic forms, harbour other more-than-
reparative possibilities, however.  They hold out a range of new modes of interaction, 
including the three grades of engagement elaborated here.  Time will tell how 
generative they prove to be as the world’s religious traditions learn new ways of 
living with their long-term disagreements. 
